My “Recent” Position Of 21 Years Ago: House Democrats Cite 1992 Duke Article in Support Of Impeachment
Recently, I wrote about how Laurence Tribe bizarrely claimed that “not long ago” I argued in favor of retroactive trials in reference to my Duke Law Journal article from 21 years ago. Now, the House managers have claimed that I supported retroactive trials up to a few weeks ago. Rep. Joe Neguse cited my Duke piece at length to support the basis for retroactive trials after saying that I supported such trials until the last few weeks. I felt Neguse did an excellent job in his argument but that statement is simply not true. His reliance, however, on the Duke article is not misplaced. I did and continue to recognize the value of such trials — and certainly the historical use of such trials. It is only his characterization of my position that was misleading. Indeed, if my views of 21 years ago are going to be cited as recent, I would at least appreciate the use of my thinner photos from the 1990s. To give you an idea of how “recent” this was, here is my picture when I wrote those words. I will now insist on it being used as a recent image.
As I have previously written, I stand by virtually everything that I wrote on the intent behind the Belknap trial and the value of such retroactive condemnations. However, I have also written for years on my own evolution on constitutional interpretation toward greater textualist and formalism over the last three decades. See, e.g.,Jonathan Turley, Madisonian Tectonics: How Function Follows Form in Constitutional and Architectural Interpretation, 83 George Washington University Law Review 305 (2015); Jonathan Turley, A Fox In The Hedges: Vermeule’s Optimizing Constitutionalism For A Suboptimal World, 82 University of Chicago Law Review 517 (2015). So I have certainly become more textualist in my views over the last three decades and have discussed the evolution. Other cited scholars like Tribe have also evolved apparently in their views. There is nothing strange about such evolution in views of constitutional interpretation. Indeed, as scholars, we are ideally always evolving in our knowledge and our views. However, I still believe retroactive active trials have dialogic value and that this remains a close question. However, my default today is more textualist on the question.
In my 1999 Duke Law Journal article on impeachment, I wrote that “[t]he Senate majority, however, was correct in its view that impeachments historically extended to former officials, such as Warren Hastings.” See Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, 49 Duke Law Journal 1-146 (1999)(emphasis added). While some have cited that line to show that I have changed my position on the subject. It doesn’t. It indeed was used retroactively in Great Britain as a historical matter, which I have always acknowledged. Yet, there are significant differences in the use of impeachment in both countries. Indeed, the colonial impeachments were strikingly different in many respects. As I noted in the Duke article, “Even if the only penalty is disqualification from future office, the open presentation of the evidence and witnesses represents the very element that was missing in colonial impeachments.”
We are left with the value of a trial for a public judgment on past conduct and the costs of a retroactive trial on the constitutional system. That has remained unresolved. The prior discussion addressed how impeachment serves a type of dialogic role in our society. Such trials can have value as with Trump. However, there are also serious countervailing costs that are equally evident in the case of Trump. This issue has not been a focus of my past writings – or the writings of most of us who have written on impeachment in prior years. I viewed it as an open question, but saw the value in such trials.
The Trump impeachments forced us to address new precedent for its implications of the process used in both impeachments. Here is the entirely what I said:
“If impeachment was simply a matter of removal, the argument for jurisdiction in the Belknap case would be easily resolved against hearing the matter. The Senate majority, however, was correct in its view that impeachments historically had extended to former officials, such as Warren Hastings. Impeachment, as demonstrated by Edmund Burke, serves a public value in addressing conduct at odds with core values in a society. At a time of lost confidence in the integrity of the government, the conduct of a former official can demand a political response. This response in the form of an impeachment may be more important than a legal response in the form of a prosecution. Regardless of the outcome, the Belknap trial addressed the underlying conduct and affirmed core principles at a time of diminishing faith in government. Absent such a trial, Belknap’s rush to resign would have succeeded in barring any corrective political action to counter the damage to the system caused by his conduct. Even if the only penalty is disqualification from future office, the open presentation of the evidence and witnesses represents the very element that was missing in colonial impeachments. Such a trial has a political value that runs vertically as a response to the public and horizontally as a deterrent to the executive branch.”
I still believe that such trials can have such a dialogic and public interest value. My Duke article can be fairly cited for that view to support arguments for retroactive trials. Clearly, these trials mean that impeachment was not considered as a matter solely of removal. The officials were already gone. It is also unassailable that such retroactive impeachments have occurred historically. Finally, there is no question that an official could bar corrective political action with a resignation. None of that has changed in my view and I have made those points in the current controversy.
My point in these writings was to address the very narrow interpretations of impeachment offered by figures like Laurence Tribe and offer a broader view of the standard. Back then, these scholars voiced a far more restrictive view of impeachment, declaring that lying under oath in the Clinton case would not be an impeachable offense. In the context of a host of impeachment allegations over the last four years, they have espoused a strikingly broader interpretation of the language of Constitution. Such views can change with time.
While only briefly addressed in my past writings, my view of this threshold issue has continued to evolve over the last 30 years of writings and later serving as lead counsel in an impeachment. I have found over these decades that departures from the language of the Constitution have often produced greater dangers and costs. I have become more textualist in that sense, but I am neither an originalist nor a strict textualist. I have discussed the trend in my writings over the last three decades. It does not change my view of the meaning of high crimes or misdemeanors. This is only a question of the jurisdiction of the Senate. If I were to write the Duke piece today, I would still maintain that it shows how impeachment trials serve this dialogic role but that, of the three outlying cases, I agree with the decision in Blount (and the view of roughly half of the Senate in Belknap) that such trials are extraconstitutional. It was historically allowed but I believe that it is not constitutionally sound. That view against retroactive impeachments is strengthened by what we have witnessed in the two Trump impeachments.
Thus, I do not fault the reliance on the Duke piece by the House managers to support the value of retroactive trials and the historical defense of such trials. I still believe that. However, my textual views did not recently change. They have changed over almost three decades. Indeed, I have been criticized for my greater reliance on the text in such interpretations.